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ABSTRACT
Time is frequently expressed with spatial motion, using one of three
diﬀerent metaphor types: moving-time, moving-ego, and sequence-as-
position. Previous work shows that children can understand and ex-
plain moving-time metaphors by age ﬁve (O¨zc¸alıs¸kan, 2005). In this
study, we focus on all three metaphor types for time, and ask whether
metaphor type has an eﬀect on children’s metaphor comprehension and
explanation abilities. Analysis of the responses of three- to six-year-old
children and adults showed that comprehension and explanation of all
three metaphor types emerge at an early age. Moreover, children’s
metaphor comprehension and explanation vary by metaphor type:
children perform better in understanding and explaining metaphors
that structure time in relation to the observer of time (moving-ego,
moving-time) than metaphors that structure time without any relation
to the observer of time (sequence-as-position-on-a-path). Our ﬁndings
suggest that children’s bodily experiences might play a role in their
developing understanding of the abstract concept of time.
INTRODUCTION
Metaphor is pervasive in human communication. We rely on metaphors not
only to EXPRESS abstract concepts, but also to STRUCTURE and UNDERSTAND
these concepts (Lakoﬀ & Johnson, 1999). In this study, we focus on one
such commonly used system of metaphors, namely spatial metaphors for
time, and ask how early in development children understand and explain
these diﬀerent spatial time metaphors.
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How do adult speakers think and talk about time as spatial motion?
English speakers routinely express and structure ‘time’ in terms ‘spatial
motion’. That is, the metaphorical construal of time involves a map-
ping – both linguistic and conceptual – from the source domain of ‘motion’
to the target domain of ‘time’ (Lakoﬀ & Johnson, 1999). For example, TIME
IS MOTION ALONG A PATH is a frequently used metaphorical mapping in
English that can give rise to a wide range of metaphorical expressions (e.g.
‘hours ﬂy by’, ‘we head to the end of the year’, ‘days follow days’). The
mapping is also built on an asymmetry between source (motion) and target
(time) concepts. That is, the mapping is unidirectional – from source to
target – and the source concept is deﬁned as being more closely related to
sensorimotor and/or intersubjective experiences than the target concept
(Gibbs, 1994; Lakoﬀ & Johnson, 1999; see also Fauconnier & Turner,
2008, for a broader description of time metaphors as an emergent structure
involving integration of multiple conceptual domains).
The formulation of metaphor as a mapping from more physical to more
abstract domains of experience is closely tied to an embodied view of
cognition, which suggests that higher-order cognitive abilities have their
roots in our everyday bodily experiences (Anderson, 2003; Barsalou, 2008;
Lakoﬀ & Johnson, 1999). In fact, recent work (Miles, Nind & Macrae,
2010) suggests that our sensory experiences of moving forward or backward
are closely associated with our concept of time. Blindfolded adults, when
asked to visualize their PAST or FUTURE life experiences while standing
upright, showed bodily sways in line with the location of time they were
visualizing. That is, when thinking about the past they swayed backward
and when thinking about the future they swayed forward. Moreover, almost
all studied languages of the world structure time on a back-to-front bodily
axis, with the ‘past behind the body’ and ‘future in front of the body,’
suggesting once again a bodily basis for one’s conceptualization of time
(Casasanto, Fotakopoulou & Boroditsky, 2010; Iwasaki, 2009; Moore,
2006; O¨zc¸alıs¸kan, 2003).
Adult speakers of English – as well as several other languages – rely on a
variety of metaphors to talk about time (e.g. time is resource, time is money,
time is motion; Lakoﬀ & Johnson, 1999); and spatial metaphors constitute
one such subsystem of metaphors that structure our concept of time (Evans,
2004; Moore, 2000; 2006; Iwasaki, 2009). The three most commonly used
spatial metaphors for time include: (1) MOVING-TIME, in which time moves
in relation to a stationary observer (e.g. ‘winter approaches’, ‘evening drifts
away’) ; (2) MOVING-EGO, in which observer of time (i.e. ego) moves in
relation to a stationary time point (e.g. ‘we approach winter’, ‘we run away
from the past’) ; and (3) SEQUENCE-AS-RELATIVE-POSITION-ON-A-PATH
(hereafter sequence-as-position), in which events in time move in relation to
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one another independent of the observer of time (e.g. ‘winter follows
autumn’, ‘playtime comes after lunch’). Previous research with adult
speakers suggests that these three spatial metaphors for time evoke con-
ceptually distinct ways of thinking about time (Boroditsky, 2000; Gentner,
Imai & Boroditsky, 2002). Adult speakers are likely to interpret ambiguous
time metaphors (e.g. ‘Next Wednesday’s meeting has been moved forward
two days’) in ways consistent with the motion primes that they observe
(Boroditsky, 2000). For example, when given moving-ego primes (e.g.
person moving towards ﬂower), adults were more likely to say that the
meeting had been moved to Friday; but when they were given primes
consistent with the moving-time metaphor (e.g. ﬂower moving towards
person), they were more likely to say that the meeting had been moved to
Monday. Similar patterns have been observed even in everyday situations:
people who have recently traveled are more likely to use a moving-ego
framework in interpreting similar ambiguous time metaphors than people
who have not yet traveled (Boroditsky & Ramscar, 2002). Adults also
showed increased reaction times in comprehension when presented with
motion primes inconsistent with the time metaphors that they hear (e.g.
ﬂower moving towards person followed by the statement ‘we are
approaching the weekend’; Gentner et al., 2002). Overall, these results
suggest that the three metaphor types trigger diﬀerent ways of thinking
about time in adult speakers.
How early in development do children learn to think and talk about time as
spatial motion?
Previous research with adult speakers suggests that the three common spa-
tial metaphors for time (moving-time, moving-ego, sequence-as-position)
are frequently used by adult speakers of English and evoke diﬀerent ways of
thinking about the concept of time. However, there is no existing work
examining developmental changes in children’s understanding of these
three diﬀerent spatial time metaphors, which capture one of the most
fundamental domains of human experience.
We know from previous work that metaphor comprehension and
production constitute signiﬁcant milestones in children’s language
development (Gardner, Winner, Bechhofer & Wolf, 1978; Lee & Kamhi,
1990; O¨zc¸alıs¸kan, 2010). Children begin to understand and produce
metaphors shortly after they begin to speak (Billow, 1981; Gardner et al.,
1978; O¨zc¸alıs¸kan, Goldin-Meadow, Gentner & Mylander, 2009), and their
metaphorical abilities improve with age (see O¨zc¸alıs¸kan, 2010, for a review).
Research has shown that children begin to spontaneously produce simple
perceptual metaphors as young as two years of age (Billow, 1981), which
involve simple perceptual similarity comparisons of things that look alike or
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are functionally similar to one another (Billow, 1981; Gentner, 1988;
O¨zc¸alıs¸kan et al., 2009; Winner, 1979). For example, a child might say that
‘a cherry lollipop is like a stop sign’, because both objects are red, round,
and attached to a stick (Mendelsohn, Robinson, Gardner & Winner, 1984).
Children then progress to more complex structural mappings, in which they
typically map physical terms onto abstract concepts, such as referring to
someone as ‘cold as ice’ to indicate how unemotional that person is
(Gardner et al., 1978; Waggoner & Palermo, 1989). The emergence of these
structural metaphors can even be observed as early as kindergarten age,
when the source or target domains of the metaphors are more familiar to
children (Keil, 1986; O¨zc¸alıs¸kan, 2005). For example, ﬁve-year-old children
can both understand and explain metaphors that are structured by motion
(‘ ideas wander through the mind’; O¨zc¸alıs¸kan, 2005; 2007) – a source
domain that structures a wide range of abstract concepts in English
(O¨zc¸alıs¸kan, 2003).
Interestingly, most of the earlier developmental work on metaphor com-
prehension and explanation focused on metaphors that involve extensions of
object properties (e.g. sweet person, warm person; Ash & Nerlove, 1960;
Waggoner & Palermo, 1989), leaving metaphors that involve extensions of
actions relatively unexplored. One exception to this is an earlier study by
O¨zc¸alıs¸kan (2007), which examined developmental changes in children’s
understanding of abstract concepts structured by spatial motion (e.g. ideas
bounce in the head, illness crawls through the body). This earlier study
examined three- to ﬁve-year-old children’s comprehension and explanation
of ‘moving-time’ metaphors in English and Turkish and found early
onset of metaphorical abilities. Children – learning either English or
Turkish – were able to understand the meaning of moving-time metaphors
by age four and could provide explanations for the diﬀerent instantiations of
the moving-time metaphors by age ﬁve (e.g. ‘‘Time crawling means it is
going really slowly like when I am bored’’ ; O¨zc¸alıs¸kan, 2007). However, we
still do not know whether children understand and explain the other two
metaphor types for time – moving-ego and sequence-as-position – at an
early age as well, showing a grasp of the whole system of spatial metaphors
for time.
In this study, our goal is to focus on a system of spatial metaphors
for time (moving-time, moving-ego, and sequence-as-position), and to
determine the developmental trajectory of children’s understanding of each
spatial metaphor type within this system. Based on earlier work (O¨zc¸alıs¸kan,
2007) that showed signiﬁcant improvements in children’s understanding
and explanation of ‘moving-time’ metaphors around age ﬁve, we predict
that children’s overall comprehension of each metaphor type will improve
with age, with a reliable change around ﬁve years of age. Also based on
earlier work with adult speakers who showed increased response times when
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answering questions framed in sequence-as-position metaphors as opposed
to moving-ego metaphors (Gentner et al., 2002), we predict that metaphor
type will have an eﬀect on both comprehension and explanation, with
children showing better performance in understanding and explaining
moving-ego and moving-time metaphors than they do for sequence-as-po-
sition metaphors.
METHODS
Participants
The participants consisted of sixty children, at the ages of THREE (mean
age=3;5, range=3;1–3;11), FOUR (mean age=4;6, range=4;1; 4;11),
FIVE (mean age=5;6, range=5;2–5;10), and SIX (mean age=6;7,
range=6;3–6;11), with ﬁfteen participants in each age group, along with
ﬁfteen ADULTS (mean age=22, range=18–50), all native speakers of
English. There were roughly equal numbers of males and females in each
age group. Child participants were predominantly Caucasian (62%) and
African American (27%); adult participants were predominantly African
American (60%), Caucasian (20%), or had mixed ethnic–racial backgrounds
(20%).
Data collection
Children’s comprehension and explanation of spatial metaphors for
time were assessed by using six short stories, each containing one of the
three metaphor types for time, namely moving-time, moving-ego, and
sequence-as-position, with two stories per metaphor type. Each child ﬁrst
participated in a metaphor comprehension task followed by a metaphor
explanation task, based on each story. In the METAPHOR COMPREHENSION
TASK, children were asked to answer forced-choice questions about the
metaphor in each story. In the METAPHOR EXPLANATION TASK, they were
asked to explain their forced-choice responses. The data collection from
children involved two puppets (Elmo and Grover), which provided the
answers to each question. The child’s task was to choose the puppet with
the correct answer and then explain the choice. The data collection from
adults did not involve the use of the puppets. The puppet that provided the
correct choice was counterbalanced across children within each age group,
and the presentation order of the six stories was randomized across subjects
in each age group (see examples 1–3; metaphors in the stories are
underlined).
The stimulus stories were chosen from among a larger set of stories that
were tested for their informative content WITHOUT the metaphors with a
group of adults (N=83,Mage=25) to ascertain that children were providing
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correct choices based on their understanding of the metaphors but not
because of the story context; only stories that elicited random forced-choice
responses (50% correct: 50% incorrect) without the metaphors were
selected and included in the study as stimulus stories after the addition of
metaphors. Each of the six stories was comparable in length and complexity
(i.e. mean length of utterance in words: MLUrange=4.2–5.6); their
presentation was also accompanied by simple black and white drawings of
the two characters in each story.
(1) Moving-ego
Stimulus story: This is Rob [Experimenter (E) points to picture of a
child character]. This is Rob’s friend Kyle [E points to picture of another
child character]. Kyle tells Rob that he has a long way to go until his party.
Rob is disappointed. He says ‘‘ugh’’. Why is Rob disappointed?
ELMO:His party is later (correct choice) ;
GROVER:His party is over (incorrect choice) ;
E:Why did you choose Elmo/Grover?
Children’s responses:
(3;6) [incorrect choice] :‘Because he has to go to bed’ (irrelevant
explanation)
(4;10) [incorrect choice] :‘Because he missed his party’ (irrelevant
explanation)
(5;7) [correct choice] :‘Because it is later’ (semi-relevant explanation)
(6;8) [correct choice] :‘A long way, that means you have to wait ’ (relevant
explanation)
(2) Moving-time
Stimulus story: This is Patrick [E points to picture of a child character].
This is Patrick’s Mom [E points to picture of an adult character]. Patrick’s
mom tells him that his trip to the zoo is coming up. Patrick gets really
excited! He shouts ‘‘Yeah!’’ Why is Patrick so excited?
ELMO:His trip to the zoo is soon (correct choice) ;
GROVER:His trip to the zoo is now (incorrect choice);
E:Why did you choose Elmo/Grover?
Children’s responses:
(3;4) [incorrect choice] :‘Because he is so excited’ (irrelevant explanation)
(4;7) [incorrect choice] :‘Because he did a good thing again’ (irrelevant
explanation)
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(5;4) [correct choice] :‘Because his mother said it ’ (irrelevant explanation)
(6;8) [correct choice] :‘Because the day that you are on the zoo is coming,
is almost here’ (relevant explanation)
(3) Sequence-as-position
Stimulus story: This is Stacy [E points to picture of a child character].
This is Stacy’s sister Carol [E points to picture of another child character].
Carol says that ice cream follows lunch. Stacy is excited. She’s says
‘‘Yippee!’’ Why is Stacy excited?
ELMO:Ice cream is soon (correct answer);
GROVER:Ice cream is now (incorrect answer);
E:Why did you choose Elmo/Grover?
Children’s responses:
(3;8) [incorrect answer]:‘Because it is trying to lick an ice cream cone’
(irrelevant explanation)
(4;7) [incorrect answer]:‘Because ice cream is yummy’ (irrelevant
explanation)
(5;8) [correct answer]:‘Because ice cream is after lunch’ (semi-relevant
explanation)
(6;7) [correct answer]:‘Because ice cream is coming up soon’ (relevant
explanation)
In addition, to test whether children understood the literal meanings of
the terms used in the metaphorical expressions in the stories, we presented
each child with six physical motion descriptions (e.g. ‘the dog is coming up
to the boy’) and asked them to choose between two pictures (e.g. dog
approaching boy vs. dog moving away from boy), only one of which
matched the physical description. The physical motion descriptions used
the same verbs and prepositions as the metaphorical descriptions in the
stories, but only conveyed physical motion meaning, thus serving as
non-metaphor control sentences (see Table 1 for the six metaphorical
motion expressions included in the stories and the six corresponding
physical motion descriptions).
DATA ANALYSIS
Children’s response to each forced-choice question in the metaphor
comprehension task was assessed on a binary scale as either 0 (correct
response) or 1 (incorrect response), and their explanation for each forced-
choice answer in the metaphor explanation task was assessed on a 3-point
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scale as either 0 (irrelevant explanation), 1 (semi-relevant explanation), or 2
(relevant explanation). Reliability was assessed on 50% of all explanations
with a second coder, with 85% agreement (k=0.81, N=32). We also
assessed children’s performance on the physical motion task on a binary
scale as either 0 (correct match) or 1 (incorrect match), resulting in a
maximum possible score of 6 across all six descriptions. Children’s
metaphor comprehension and metaphor explanation scores were analyzed
separately, using two-way ANOVAs, with AGE (3-, 4-, 5-, 6-year-olds,
adults) as a between-subjects factor and METAPHOR TYPE (moving-time,
moving-ego, sequence-as-position) as a within-subject factor. We also
assessed diﬀerences from chance performance in overall metaphor
comprehension scores using independent t-tests. In addition, diﬀerences in
children’s understanding of metaphorical motion vs. physical motion
descriptions were analyzed with a two-way ANOVA, with AGE as a
between-subjects factor and DESCRIPTION TYPE (metaphorical motion,
physical motion) as a within-subject factor. We tested for homogeneity of
variance for between group comparisons using Levene’s test of equality
of error variances, and found no signiﬁcant diﬀerences in variance in any of
the comparisons, except for main eﬀect of age in metaphor comprehension
(Levene statistic, p=0.02). Accordingly, for metaphor comprehension
analysis we used Brown-Forsythe F-ratio and Games Howell corrections
for assessing main eﬀect of age and post hoc comparisons for age, respect-
ively. The eﬀect sizes were computed by using partial eta-squared
(hereafter pg2) for ANOVA comparisons and Cohen’s d (hereafter d) for
t-tests.
RESULTS
We ﬁrst examined overall changes in children’s metaphorical abilities
ACROSS all three metaphor types, and found early comprehension.
TABLE 1. Metaphorical motion statements in the metaphor comprehension task
and the corresponding physical motion statements in the picture-choice task
Metaphor type Metaphorical motion Physical motion
Moving-time His trip to the zoo is coming up. The dog is coming up to the boy.
The time for bed has come up. The duck has come to the pond.
Moving-ego He has to long way to go
until his party.
The blue car has a long
way to go to get to the red car.
They are coming up on recess. The rabbit is coming up to his cage.
Sequence-
as-position
Ice cream follows lunch. The boy follows the girl.
Lunch follows washing up. The horse follows the pig.
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Five-year-olds performed signiﬁcantly above chance in providing correct
forced-choice responses (65% correct; t(14)=3.17, p=0.007, d=2.15),
marking the onset of metaphor comprehension at age ﬁve. In contrast, both
three- and four-year-olds were at chance (48% correct, t(14)=x0.397,
p=0.7; and 57% correct, t(14)=1.16, p=0.4, respectively) in their
responses to the questions about the metaphors in the stories.
Next we asked whether children would diﬀer in their comprehension and
explanation of the diﬀerent spatial metaphors for time (moving-ego,
moving-time, sequence-as-position) over developmental time. Beginning
with METAPHOR COMPREHENSION, which was measured by children’s correct
forced-choice responses in the story task, we found an eﬀect of AGE (F(4, 54)
=1 5.81, p<0.001, pg2=0.47) and METAPHOR TYPE (F(2, 140)=3.24,
p=0.042, pg2=0.04), but no interaction (F(8, 140)=0.419, p=0.9). As can
be seen in Figure 1A, children steadily improved their metaphor compre-
hension over time, with a signiﬁcant change between ages ﬁve and six
(Mﬁve=3.93 [SD=1.6] vs. Msix=5.13 [SD=0.90], Games Howell,
p=0.04). The adults (M=5.73 [SD=0.45]) and six-year-olds, on the other
hand, did NOT diﬀer from each other in their rate of correct responses
(Games Howell, p=0.25), suggesting adult-like metaphor comprehension
abilities by age six. Overall, children performed marginally worse in
grasping the meaning of sequence-as-position metaphors than both MOVING-
TIME (LSD, p=0.01) and MOVING-EGO (LSD, p=0.09) metaphors.
However, there was no reliable diﬀerence (LSD, p=0.45) in their compre-
hension of moving-time and moving-ego metaphors.
Turning next to METAPHOR EXPLANATION, which was measured by
children’s explanations for their forced-choice responses in the story task,
we once again found an eﬀect of AGE (F(4, 70)=8.39, p<0.001, pg2=0.32),
and METAPHOR TYPE, (F(2, 70)=6.46, p=0.003, pg2=0.06) as well as
Fig 1. Mean metaphor comprehension score (Panel A) and mean metaphor explanation
score (Panel B) for moving-time (solid gray lines), moving-ego (dashed gray lines) and
sequence as position metaphors (solid black lines) by child age.
NOTE : We plotted the data using line graphs for clarity of presentation even though the
design was cross-sectional.
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a signiﬁcant INTERACTION (F(6, 70)=3.67, p=0.001, pg2=0.14). Children
provided better explanations for their forced-choice responses over time,
with a signiﬁcant change between ages ﬁve and six (Mﬁve=2.93 [SD=1.9]
vs. Msix=5.6 [SD=2.7], LSD, p=0.03). And similar to the metaphor
comprehension task, six-year-olds did NOT diﬀer reliably from adults
(M=5.53, [SD=2.7]) in the quality of their explanations (LSD, p=0.94),
suggesting adult-like explanation abilities by age six (see Figure 1B). One
interesting diﬀerence, however, was that unlike six-year-olds, who focused
their explanations on the metaphorical statements in the stories, adults
tended to focus on the reasons for the emotional reactions of the characters
in their explanations, which also led to lower explanation scores for the
adults. Overall, participants did worse in justifying their responses to the
questions about the meaning of sequence-as-position metaphors than both
moving-time (LSD, p=0.02) and moving-ego (LSD, p=0.007) metaphors;
and this pattern was particularly pronounced for the ﬁve-year-olds
(moving-ego vs. sequence-as-position: LSD, p=0.04) and the six-year-olds
(moving-ego or moving-time vs. sequence-as-position: LSD, ps <=0.01).
However, children did not diﬀer in their explanations for the moving-time
and moving-ego metaphors at any age (LSD, ps=0.1; see examples 1–3 for
sample forced-choice responses in brackets and explanations provided by
children for each metaphor type).
Last, we examined diﬀerences between children’s understanding of the
metaphorical motion descriptions in the stories and their understanding of
the corresponding physical motion descriptions in the picture choice task,
and found a signiﬁcant eﬀect of motion type (F(1, 56)=90.50, p<0.001,
pg2=0.62), a signiﬁcant eﬀect of age (F(1, 56)=10.47, p<0.001, pg2=0.36),
and a signiﬁcant interaction (F(3, 56)=2.81, p=0.048, pg2=0.13). Overall,
children understood the meaning of physical motion descriptions signiﬁ-
cantly better than the meaning of metaphorical motion descriptions
(Mphysical motion=5.57 [SD=0.93] vs.Mmetaphorical motion=3.85 [SD=1.49]),
but it was their understanding of metaphorical motion descriptions – not
physical motion descriptions – that improved reliably with age. Almost all chil-
dren (N=58/60) performed at ceiling in the physical motion description task,
showing that they all understood the physical meaning of the motion expressions
used in the metaphors by age three, with no reliable change over time.
DISCUSSION
In this study we examined three- to six-year-old children’s ability to
understand and explain the diﬀerent spatial metaphors for time, namely
moving-time, moving-ego, and sequence-as-position, and found early onset
of both metaphor comprehension and metaphor explanation abilities.
Children were able to understand the meaning of spatial metaphors for time
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reliably above chance by age ﬁve; they also began to provide relevant
explanations for the diﬀerent time metaphors by age six. These ﬁndings
further extend previous work on children’s comprehension and explanation
of moving-time metaphors (e.g. O¨zc¸alıs¸kan 2004; 2007) to the other two
spatial metaphors for time (moving-ego, sequence-as-position-on-a-path),
but with a delay of one year in achieving each milestone. The one-year gap
in children’s performance between this earlier work and ours is likely to be
an outcome of the diﬃculty associated with the sequence-as-position
metaphors. Our results showed that children performed worse in both
understanding and explaining sequence-as-position metaphors for time as
compared to moving-ego and moving-time metaphors.
What makes sequence-as-position metaphors more diﬃcult for children?
There are several possible explanations. One possibility is that the
sequence-as-position metaphor is cognitively more challenging than other
spatial metaphors for time because it draws on the child’s experience as an
OBSERVER of time’s motion through space. Indeed, previous work by
Gentner et al. (2002), which showed longer reaction times in adults’
responses to questions about sequence-as-position metaphors than to
questions about moving-ego metaphors, provides support for this possi-
bility. Gentner and colleagues argued that sequence-as-position metaphors
are more diﬃcult for adults because they typically contain a temporal
relationship between two events and an implicit observer, whereas
moving-ego metaphors contain just the relationship between an event and
an observer.1
A second possibility is that the moving-ego and moving-time metaphors
present a more embodied conception of time. Humans have a myriad
of experience with the movement of their bodies through space; and
moving-ego and moving-time metaphors are based on this experience: the
former frames time as moving toward or away from a stationary self, while
the latter construes the self as moving toward or away from a stationary
point in time. Moving-time and moving-ego metaphors thus rely only on
our ﬁrst person perspective, something with which all humans have
considerable experience, whereas sequence-as-position metaphors rely on
the observation of the relational movement of multiple events that are
independent from the self, namely the ego or the observer of time. There is,
in fact, a growing body of evidence that suggests that our bodily experience
is an important ingredient in forming knowledge representations and that
linguistic meaning is grounded in sensorimotor experience (Barsalou, 2008;
[1] In this earlier study, Gentner et al. (2002) classiﬁed sequence-as-position metaphors as a
subcategory of moving-time metaphors. However, almost all of the moving-time
metaphors used in the Gentner et al. study belonged to the subcategory of sequence-as-
position metaphors, which was deﬁned as a distinct type of spatial time metaphor in this
study, following Moore’s (2000; 2006) classiﬁcation.
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Glenberg & Kaschak, 2002; Lakoﬀ, 1987). As such, metaphors couched in
ﬁrst person motion experience may be easier for children to comprehend, as
children rely heavily on sensorimotor schemas to make sense of the world
that surrounds them (Piaget, 1973; Mandler, 1999).
A third, but not mutually exclusive, possibility is that changes in
children’s understanding of others’ minds, thus perspective taking ability,
might serve as a stepping stone in grasping the meaning of time metaphors
that are not framed in ﬁrst person perspective. Researchers argue that
changes in understanding others’ mental states (at least partly) explain
changes in children’s metaphorical abilities (e.g. Happe´, 1993; 1995;
Martin & McDonald, 2004; Schnell, 2007). According to this view,
children’s understanding of others’ mental states (i.e. theory of mind
understanding) shows rapid progress in preschool years, and children begin
to understand that others may have diﬀerent beliefs than their own around
ages four to ﬁve (Welman, 1990); the age at which they also show signiﬁcant
improvements in their metaphor comprehension (Schnell, 2007). Unlike
moving-time and moving-ego metaphors, sequence-as-position metaphors
require a perspective outside of the child’s immediate ﬁrst person ‘egocen-
tric’ experience with time (i.e. time moving towards child, child moving
towards time); as such, the understanding of others’ minds as separate from
one’s own might serve as an important social–cognitive ability that could
feed into the developmental change in children’s understanding of
sequence-as-position metaphors.
Research on metaphor suggests early production abilities: soon after they
produce their ﬁrst words, children begin to spontaneously produce a range a
novel perceptual metaphors highlighting similarities between objects (e.g.
calling a half-peeled banana a ‘ﬂower’, Elbers, 1988; saying ‘like ice-cream’
while pointing to a mushroom, O¨zc¸alıs¸kan et al., 2009). This initial period
of development, rich in lexical innovations, is followed by a period marked
by limited production of spontaneous metaphors in the early school years,
and there is no existing work examining children’s spontaneous production
of more complex structural metaphors in everyday contexts. Our study fo-
cused on children’s COMPREHENSION of such structural metaphors and has
provided evidence that children can both understand and explain their
understanding of structural metaphors for time by ﬁve to six years of
age. However, the question remains as to whether the PRODUCTION of
such structural metaphors PRECEDES, COINCIDES WITH, or FOLLOWS their
comprehension in development – a question that only future studies could
answer. Our study also used a quasi-experimental, cross-sectional design,
focusing on a subsystem of metaphors for time. Future research examining
a broader range of time metaphors, using longitudinal observations in
everyday contexts (e.g. parent–child interactions at home) could shed
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further light on how early in development children both understand and
produce the diﬀerent metaphors for time.
The tasks that we used in assessing children’s metaphorical abilities in
our study were linguistic in nature, raising the possibility that the observed
changes in metaphor comprehension and explanation might simply be an
artifact of more global changes in children’s language abilities, particularly
their metalinguistic ability (Winner, 1979). Metaphor involves a
correspondence between two semantic domains, giving rise to meanings
that require both DIFFERENTIATION of lexical meanings within each semantic
domain and INTEGRATION of these meanings as a juxtaposition of the two
domains (Kittay & Lehrer, 1981). For example, in order to grasp
the meaning of the metaphor ‘she is a sweet person’, the child needs to
diﬀerentiate the word ‘sweet’ from other taste terms (e.g. ‘sour’, ‘bitter’)
against a gradient of personality types, and arrive at the metaphorical
meaning by integrating his/her semantic knowledge of both of these
domains. Not surprisingly, the metalinguistic ability to understand that
words can simultaneously have a literal and an extended metaphorical
meaning takes time to develop. As shown in previous work (e.g. Asch &
Nerlove, 1960; O¨zc¸alıs¸kan, 2005), children initially focus exclusively on the
source domain (i.e. literal) meaning of a metaphor in their explanations,
treating metaphorical statements as if they are literally true (e.g. ‘time ﬂies
by means it ﬂies like a bird’), and only later produce explanations that show
their integrated knowledge of the source and target domain meanings (e.g.
‘time ﬂies by means it goes by fast not giving me much time to color’ ;
O¨zc¸alıs¸kan, 2005). A similar developmental trajectory might be at work
here, with children initially focusing on the source domain meaning of the
spatial metaphors for time, and only later developing the metalinguistic
ability to reﬂect on the underlying meaning of these metaphorical
statements based on both the source and the target semantic domains.
In our study, children were also able to verbally EXPLAIN their
understanding of metaphorical meanings a year later than they were able to
UNDERSTAND the same metaphors in a non-verbal comprehension task.
Similar diﬀerences have been reported in previous work: children show
better metaphorical abilities in tasks that exert fewer linguistic demands (i.e.
identifying meaning of a metaphor in a multiple-choice task) compared to
tasks that impose greater linguistic demands (i.e. paraphrasing meaning of a
metaphor; e.g. Winner, Rosentiel & Gardner, 1976). As such, it is possible
that overall changes that we have observed in children’s metaphorical
abilities, particularly in their explanations, might be an outcome of their
growing metalinguistic abilities that allows for explicit linguistic reﬂection
on the part of the child. At the same time, however, beyond changes in
linguistic ability as contributing to metaphor development, our ﬁndings also
showed that children were better at understanding metaphors based on the
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movement of their own bodies than the metaphors that are less directly
tied to their sensorimotor experiences, thus suggesting an eﬀect of
embodiment in metaphor development. It will be important to explore the
generalizability of this eﬀect in future studies, by comparing metaphor
comprehension across a wider range of abstract domains that vary in degree
of embodiment in their metaphorical construal.
In summary, our results show early understanding of spatial metaphors
for time. Children can grasp the meaning of the moving-ego, moving-time,
and sequence-as-position metaphors by age FIVE and begin to verbally
explain their metaphorical interpretations by age SIX. Children’s emerging
ability to understand the three spatial metaphors for time also show varia-
bility, with metaphors that structure time in relation to the observer of time
being mastered earlier than metaphors that structure time without any
relation to the observer of time. These ﬁndings thus lend support to the
distinctive role our bodily experiences could play in our developing
understanding of abstract concepts.
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